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ABSTRACT
As two Acts on direct democracy procedures at the national level were passed only 
earlier  this  year  (2006),  citizens  have  not  yet  had  time  to  truly  apprehend  the 
extraordinary change in their political rights. Additionally, the government has made 
no effort to adequately inform the people of these powerful instruments they may now 
recur to, to make their voices heard.  The fact that these instruments have not yet 
been tested, either at the lower municipal level or the national level, makes it difficult 
to  assess  their  appropriateness.  Notwithstanding,  certain  organized  groups  have 
already  made  official  their  intention  to  collect  signatures,  in  order  to  petition  a 
referendum on whether to ratify the Free Trade Agreement signed two years ago with 
the United States of America.  
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1. Introduction
Costa Rica is, without doubt,  known and respected worldwide for its longstanding 
democratic  tradition.  This  has  astonished  many  international  analysts,  given  the 
convulsed geopolitical context in which this relatively small nation has developed.1 
Not surprisingly, this consolidated democratic political stability has earned Costa Rica 
the  international  nickname  of  “the  Switzerland  of  Central  America”.   There  was, 
nevertheless, one important aspect in which Costa Rica, until very recently, trailed far 
behind its Helvetic paragon, it lacked the multiple and perfected instruments of direct 
democracy that Switzerland is envied for: the Referendum and the Iniciativa Popular. 
However,  Costa Rica caught up just a few years ago when it  finally adopted and 
implemented  these  valuable  instruments  of  modern  democracy  in  its  legal  and 
constitutional framework.  Both the Referendum and the Iniciativa Popular are now 
available to Costa Rican citizens as part of their democratic political rights arsenal, 
but, because of their novelty, they have not yet been tested.  This is true both at the 
national and the municipal level, even though these instruments have existed at the 
lower  local  government level  for  almost  a decade now.  The  Iniciativa Popular,  in 
Costa Rica, is a democratic mechanism through which a minimum 5% of the Costa 
Rican  citizenry  can  initiate  the  law-making  process  and  present  a  draft  Bill  for 
adoption  of  a  new law,  an amendment  to  an existing  statute,  or  a  constitutional 
reform which will  later be voted on before it becomes official.  The Referendum, in 
turn, is a vote by the People on a legal or constitutional text to approve or improve. 
In Costa Rica the result of a referendum is binding, if a “quorum” threshold of valid 
registered voters is attained.
In the following pages, we intend to follow the evolution of Costa Rican democracy, 
from a closed representative democracy to a much more open, modern democratic 
regime; one that allows for greater public involvement that gives it legitimacy. We will 
then highlight the main characteristics of institutional public participation mechanisms 
in Costa Rica and both critically assess the introduced instruments and speculate on 
their immediate possible uses in the light of Costa Rican social and political reality. 
Finally, we will briefly address the related question of so called e-democracy in Costa 
Rica.  A short conclusion will present our final thoughts.
2. Historic Evolution of Costa Rican Democracy
As mentioned  in  the  introduction,  direct  democracy  instruments  are  nowadays  a 
complementary part  of  the Costa Rican legal  and political  representative system. 
This is the product of a historical process that has led to a democratic maturity of the 
Costa Rican citizenship.
The Longing for Participative Democracy.
1 Auditoría Ciudadana, pg. 42.
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For the XXI Century Costa Rican citizen, the concept of democracy has little to do 
with  classic  Hellenic  protodemocracy.   The  current  civic  context  covers  a  much 
broader and diffuse concept which includes many and varied aspects to take into 
account.  This no longer refers simply to the existence of clean and regularly held 
elections of representatives, but further considers, as equally essential components 
of  modern  democracy,  civil  rights  protection,  transparent  and  public  interest  led 
institutions, and accountability of the elected public servants.2 
Other  basic  democracy  essentials,  from  the  Costa  Rican  citizen’s  perspective, 
include equality of conditions, treatment and opportunities, all of which have been 
dominant ingredients in our Nation’s history, characterized by a first world standard of 
education  and  a  prominent,  although  diluting,  middle  class.   For  Costa  Ricans, 
however, the most important element arising from democracy is the expressed desire 
to actively participate in  political  affairs which,  in the past  decade,  was called by 
some authors as a “yearning  for  participative  democracy”,  as opposed to  being 
restricted to a representative democracy.
Today, we may state without doubt that this yearning for participative democracy has 
been  assuaged  as  Costa  Rica  has  gone,  in  a  decade,  from  being  a  purely 
representative democracy to becoming a hybrid one that incorporates several direct 
democracy instruments.  Citizens  can now enjoy  different  mechanisms  that  allow, 
from the lowest (or more accurately, closest) district level to the highest constitutional 
level, for their participation in their Country’s direction.  
Costa Rican Democracy of the Second Republic.
It is not within the scope of this paper to completely retrace the history of Costa Rican 
democratic evolution, but most authors agree that Costa Rica did not become a true 
and  complete  working  democracy  until  1949.   In  1948,  Costa  Rica  had  just 
experienced a Civil War provoked by fraudulent elections wherein the government, 
then  in  charge  of  both  electoral  procedures  and  administration,  manipulated  the 
results in favour of the governing republican-communist Coalition’s candidate.  The 
opposing “National Liberation” movement eventually overthrew the illegitimate new 
Government (whose followers were exiled) and proclaimed the Second Republic.  
The exceptional feature of this historic event was that the military National Liberation 
movement, led by “Pepe” Figueres, chose not to exercise this power obtained by 
coup  d’Etat,  but  instead  abolished  the  army,  summoned  a  national  assembly  of 
recognized  intellectuals  to  draft  a  new Constitution,  convened  new elections  and 
soon enough handed over the government to the new and now legitimately elected 
President. 
This may truly be taken as the turning point  in the page of modern Costa Rica’s 
democratic  history,  for  the  newly  drafted  Constitution  which  emerged  from  that 
National  Assembly in 1949 was a well  balanced document.  They based it  on the 
previous 1872 Constitution and, while renovating the government structure and game 
of  powers,  incorporated new and important  institutions,  including the independent 
2 Rodríguez,  Florisabel,  Seminario Ciudadanía Restringida: Valores democráticos y apoyo 
hacia el sistema político en Centroamérica, Procesos, INCAE, Alajuela 2006.  
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Electoral Tribunal, the “Fourth Power” of Costa Rica, with exclusive jurisdiction over 
all electoral law matters.  
And so,  from 1949,  Costa Rican constitutional  democracy’s  main features are:  a 
paternalist presidential political regime; a unicameral blocked-list elected parliament; 
a  strong  and  totally  independent  Judicial  Power;  a  centralized  administration, 
territory-wise,  but  with  several  autonomous  institutions  ratione  materiae;  and 
foremost, no military. In 1975, the full democratic transition was attained when the 
last  restriction  to  electoral  participation,  which  forbade  communist  parties,  was 
cleared so enabling any political party to run for office, despite its ideology.  
The Aborted Introduction of Public Consultations in 1949.
Back in  1949,  after  the  creation  of  the Second  Republic  in  Costa Rica,  the  first 
attempt  to  incorporate  a  public  participation  mechanism  in  the  form  of  a  large 
spectrum referendum was aborted.  The National Convened Constituting Assembly, 
comprised of many eminent and scholarly lawyers who had completed their studies 
abroad,  specifically  described  a  direct  citizen  consultation  for  any  Constitutional 
amendment bill.3  The already instituted referendum in the Constitution of another 
Latin American Nation, Uruguay, became one of many sources of inspiration for such 
a  mechanism  of  public  participation.  The  proposed  provision  stated  that  the 
referendum would be held at the same time as the next scheduled national elections. 
However, although this proposal was endorsed by the Governing Council,  it never 
made it into the final adopted Constitution.  Only the  Plebiscite was retained as a 
mandatory consultation device, but with a territorial scope limited to the creation of 
new provinces.
Practical  considerations  were  put  forward  as  the  justification  for  leaving  such  a 
consultation out, but it was mainly the ruling class’s lack of trust in the people’s ability 
to comprehend the delicate task of adopting or rejecting Constitutional provisions that 
ultimately prevented the referendum from entering the Constitution.  This failure to 
hand the sovereign power back to the people was due, according to the National 
Assembly members themselves, to the fear that the people would not make good 
use of such instruments, given their poor cultural and educational levels at that time. 
One of the Assembly members, while regretting this decision, pointed out that the 
referendum proposal “has a deep democratic meaning, since it gives the People the 
opportunity to directly relate to a constitutional amendment.  However, although this 
system is good in theory, it might not work in a Country such as ours, in which we are 
not used to the referendum system, a system that has been established by many 
countries.  For us, it would be too troublesome to carry out consultations to resolve 
this or that issue.”4  It would be more than fifty years of delegated democracy before 
such  a  mechanism  of  direct  public  participation  was  finally  introduced  into  the 
Constitution
Introduction of a  Mandatory National Plebiscite on New Provinces
3 Section  274  of  the  Draft  Political  Constitution  of  1949,  presented  by  the  National 
Constituting Assembly.  Referred by Ubico, Carlos, op. cit. pg. 111.
4 Quote original from Volio Sancho, in Ibid.
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One  important  provision,  nonetheless,  made  its  way  into  the  original  1949 
Constitution. It established a mandatory direct consultation to citizens in Provinces to 
be severed for creating new territorial circumscriptions.
Costa  Rica’s  political  territory  is  divided  into  seven  Provinces,  which  are  in  turn 
composed  of  Cantons,  with  each  Canton  having  a  local  government  or 
Municipalidad.  Parliament may create new provinces, according to Article 168 of the 
Costa Rican Constitution, provided it has previously received an affirmative vote to 
the  projected  law  from  the  affected  provinces5.   The  oldest  and  more  natural 
instrument for direct consultation and, in Costa Rica, bears a special  meaning is, 
perhaps, the Plebiscite.  It  was through a Plebiscite that Nicoyans freely chose to 
belong to Costa Rica instead of Nicaragua. Nicoya, in the northern Pacific region of 
the country which is now part of the Guanacaste province, was annexed to Costa 
Rica by way of a public consultation held in the late nineteenth Century.  However, 
the scope of this instrument in our Constitution is restricted to territorial restructuring 
and,  to  date,  has  never  been  implemented;  although  there  have  been  some 
initiatives to create new provinces in recent years, none of which has really found an 
echo in Parliament.  
Two things are worth noting though: the first is that neither a law nor any other type 
of regulations have been enacted to address the basic conditions on how such a 
Plebiscite  would  be  implemented,  nor  are  there  any  quorum  nor  participation 
thresholds set to validate such a Plebiscite.  The Constitutional Court, however, has 
stated that the Plebiscite is an unavoidable previous step for any legislative bill which 
aims to create a new province.  The second is that local authorities have identified 
that the constitutional Plebiscite is in fact a restricted referendum, as the text of the 
constitutional provision states that the people will vote on a proposed bill of law, and 
not on whether they would agree to the creation of a province in abstracto. 
The Need for a Democratic Makeover.
The Constitution of 1949 is the one still in force in Costa Rica, almost 60 years after it 
was adopted, evidence both of its wide acceptance and the quality of its intellectual 
contents.  From that moment on, one can assert that Costa Rica has led a sound 
democratic life incorporating political alternation in clean and unchallenged elections 
which take place every four years to elect the People’s representatives.6  
5 Art. 168.2 of the Costa Rican Constitution reads: “La Asamblea Legislativa podrá decretar,  
observando  los  trámites  de  reforma  parcial  a  esta  Constitución,  la  creación  de  nuevas 
provincias, siempre que el proyecto respectivo fuera aprobado de previo en un plebiscito que  
la Asamblea ordenará celebrar en la provincia o provincias que soporten la desmembración.”
6 Estado de la Nación, Auditoría ciudadana, pg. 42: “Diversos factores, asentados poco antes 
y durante este período, contribuyeron al afianzamiento de la estabilidad democrática; entre  
ellos cabe mencionar los siguientes: la abolición del ejercito como institución permanente en  
1949, que eliminó del escenario a una fuerza que en casi todos los países de América Latina 
generó inestabilidad política; el desarrollo de un Estado social de derecho, que fortaleció el  
respeto y la protección de los derechos ciudadanos y la sujeción, en la práctica, del poder 
político a la Constitución y las leyes; la depuración de un sistema electoral independiente de  
los otros poderes del Estado y capaz de garantizar elecciones limpias, libres y competidas; y  
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However,  as the twenty first  Century approached,  this paradigm exhibited its first 
signs  of  weariness;  political  apathy  and  nonconformity  began  to  take  over  the 
population  and,  with  an  ever  increasing  non-participation,  this  discontent  spread 
down to new generations.  Many Costa Ricans had appeared to have lost faith in 
their  appointees,  although  they  clearly  supported  democracy  and  its  institutions. 
Much of this despondency had been caused, in part, by a combination of events: the 
Central American refugee immigration wave that exceeded the Costa Rican social 
capacity  in  the  1980s;  the  lethargy  of  its  economy;  and  a  few major  corruption 
scandals that had rocked the foundations of political integrity.
The time had come to rethink the political system and give some sovereignty back to 
its rightful and legitimate holder: the People.
3. Introduction of Direct Democracy Procedures
In the last few years Costa Rican democratic evolution has been given a qualitative 
leap by having new mechanisms introduced which allow greater citizen participation 
in public affairs at all levels of government.
The Players
Even  before  the  very  recent  major  reforms  to  the  Costa  Rican  democratic  legal 
framework took place, some actors had already begun playing an important role in 
aiding to perfect Costa Rican democracy, and had even started to make headway to 
enable citizens an  increased participation in political decision making.  We refer to a 
varied number of institutions, entities and individuals, both from the private and public 
sectors.  Among the first group are: universities; students and scholars; economic 
interest groups; lobbies; chambers of commerce; labour syndicates and unions; and 
even political parties.  
At the public level, such contribution to Costa Rican democracy found a source in a 
few Institutions.  These are:  the Constitutional  Chamber  of  the Supreme Court  of 
Justice; the Citizen Ombudsman (Defensoría de los Habitantes); and the Oficina de 
Iniciativa Popular of Parliament; of which we shall speak ut infra.  However, it is the 
Tribunal  Supremo  de  Elecciones,  or  Electoral  Tribunal,  who  has  had,  from  its 
creation, the most prominent institutional role in making Costa Rica a true “Estado 
social y democrático de derecho” (Social and Democratic Rule-of-Law State). The 
Electoral Tribunal is also the key player in the new Direct Democratic game. 
el rápido progreso económico y social del país, que mejoró las condiciones de vida de la 
mayoría de la población.” 
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The Electoral Tribunal was created in the 1949 Constitution.  It is an independent 
body with the restricted but exclusive power and jurisdiction in all matters related to 
voting  and elections.  In  Article  99 of  the  Constitution,  it  states that  the  Electoral 
Tribunal is  in charge of the organization,  direction and supervision of all  electoral 
activities.   According to Article  9  of  the Constitution,  the Electoral  Tribunal  is  an 
additional fourth State Power that completes the classic division of Powers doctrine 
triad  that  our  countries  have  inherited  from Montesquieu.   As  a  corollary  to  this 
independency, only the Electoral Tribunal can interpret the constitutional provisions 
relating  to  political  rights  and “electoral  matters”.   It  has  been  granted exclusive 
jurisdiction over political and electoral rights violations and consequently, it is before 
the Electoral Tribunal that an affected citizen must seek remedy by filing an “Amparo 
Electoral” action, thus excluding common jurisdiction of all common ordinary courts 
and even the Constitutional Chamber.7
It  can  be  seen  that  the  new legal  framework  of  democratic  participation  further 
entrusts the Electoral Tribunal with the whole referendum procedure including the 
scrutiny  and  final  result  declaration,  and  assigns  to  it  the  compliance  review  of 
signatures  collected  and  other  preliminary  stage  requirements  of  the  iniciativa 
popular.
The Procedure Leading to the 2003 Reform
The loss of trust in political leaders became apparent by the end of the last decade, 
as participation in national elections decreased to such an extent that new records of 
discontent were attained among the population.  A political episode, which took place 
in  1999,  further encouraged  the need for  political  reform.  In that  year,  a direct 
confrontation  occurred  between  the  new  government  and  some  major  left-wing 
interest groups on the subject of economic policy reforms; specifically, a project to 
privatize  a  State  Monopoly  on  Electricity  supply  and  Telecommunications.   This 
ended in numerous and sizeable protests and also blockages of major access roads, 
that were mainly organized by unions and students.
7 Brenes, Luis Diego, Rivera, Juan Luis, Recurso de Amparo Electoral, in Revista de Derecho 
Electoral, nº1, 2006,  “A fortiori, la jurisprudencia constitucional nacional, tanto aquella que 
emana de la Sala Constitucional como la propia del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, han 
dejado claro que, como máxima autoridad jurisdiccional en la materia electoral, el Tribunal  
Supremo de Elecciones es un órgano especializado, que por su naturaleza y competencias,  
está llamado a ser un auténtico Tribunal Constitucional, de suerte tal que, necesariamente,  
quebranta  el  principio  de  universalidad  y  unidad  del  Poder  Judicial  en  la  resolución  de  
conflictos  jurisdiccionales;  y,  además,  tiende  a  exceptuar  el  control  concentrado  de 
constitucionalidad  en  manos  de  la  Sala  Constitucional.   Así  las  cosas,  este  acuerdo  
jurisprudencial  que  considera  al  Tribunal  Supremo  de  Elecciones  como  un  tribunal  
constitucional especializado, es el que a su vez sustenta el pleno desarrollo por parte del  
órgano  electoral  de  institutos  propios  y  característicos  de  una  jurisdicción  constitucional  
ordinaria, caso del recurso de amparo electoral y de la desaplicación de normas estatutarias 
por inconstitucionales a la luz de un caso concreto.”
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Unsurprisingly, it was the then opposition social-democrat party, Liberación Nacional, 
and in particular some of its far-left members, who promoted the introduction into the 
Constitution  of  the  new direct  democratic  procedures,  referendum  and  iniciativa 
popular.
The  process  did  not  take  very  long  to  accomplish,  given  that  they  found  little 
opposition from other political parties. Nonetheless, they encountered some caveats 
and  scepticism among certain  government  officials  and  even  from the  Country’s 
intellectual  elite.  Certain  well-known  columnists  and  political  experts  severely 
distrusted the transition from a well established partisan representative democratic 
system to the one of “dangerous participative democracy”. Their concern was that 
people could be easily manipulated by powerful interest groups8; such as the public 
sector labour unions.  These unions have demonstrated, with unjustified strikes and 
street protests, their unlawful strength to manipulate public opinion and bring down 
important projects for the country.  Those unfavourable voices were in the minority, 
however, for the nascence of new democratic rights and instruments was welcomed 
overall by the vast majority of parties represented in Parliament.
The Recent Introduction of Direct Democracy Instruments 
In  2003,  the  rather  discrete  and  smooth  political  process  culminated  with  the 
amendment of several provisions to the Costa Rican Constitution, which introduced 
some highly relevant changes to our democratic system. The Iniciativa Popular and 
the Referendum, both for constitutional and legislative bills,  were introduced on a 
national scale. These instruments, together with the already existing (but limited in 
scope) Plebiscite, completed the Direct Democracy constitutional framework of Costa 
Rica.  
It took the Parliamente three years to legislate on these instruments to effectively 
make them available to the citizens.9 It wasn’t until April 2006, that the two Statues 
8 See, for instance, Claudio Gutierrez’s opinion article in “La Nación”, March 3, 2002, where 
he says: “  trocar la democracia representativa, que tanto ha contribuido históricamente a la  
salud política de Costa Rica, por una “democracia participativa” en que directivos de grupos  
de intereses “ningún electo  por  el  pueblo’  se  arrogan el  poder,  sería  peor  que trocar  la  
primogenitura por un plato de lentejas”.
9 An interesting anecdote legally speaking is that the 2003 constitutional reform container a 
transitory provision in the form of a direct mandate to the Asamblea Legislativa to aprobé the 
laws  that  would  implement  the  new  mechanisms  of  referéndum  and  iniciativa  popular. 
However, the Parliament did not comply with this constitutional mandate in the established 
term, which caused the Citizen´s Ombudsman to complain before the Constitutional Chamber 
of the Supreme Court, who indeed scolded the law-makers and requested they immediately 
adopt  both  statutes.   Newspapers  reported  this  unprecedented  vote  like  this:  “La  Sala 
Constitucional declaró ayer con lugar y en forma unánime, la acción de inconstitucionalidad 
interpuesta por el Defensor de los Habitantes, José Manuel Echandi y Gabriel Bonilla Picado,  
para que la Asamblea Legislativa dicte las leyes que regulen el referéndum y la iniciativa  
popular.  Lo  anterior  implica  que  la  ciudadanía  recupera  la  posibilidad  de  promover  u 
oponerse  a  diversas  iniciativas  legislativas,  aprobándolas  o  improbándolas,  así  como  el 
ejercicio del control sobre la actividad de los diputados. Se trata de una sentencia histórica  
que  se  dicta  en  forma  rápida  luego  de  la  audiencia  pública  (vista)  efectuada  el  21  de  
abril.” (Al Día).
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were approved to regulate and implement the newly adopted Iniciativa Popular and 
Referendum: these are the Law on Referendum and the Law on Iniciativa Popular.  
However,  back in 1998,  the refunded Municipal  Code had already introduced the 
referendum and plebiscite at the local –municipal- level, as well as at the communal 
or  district  levels.   According to the Municipal  Code provisions,  the Municipalities, 
which  are  the  Cantonal  local  governments,  must  allow  and  “foment  the  active, 
informed and democratic participation of the people in local government decisions”, 
for  which  participation  will  first  be  made possible  through  the instruments  of  the 
referendum and the plebiscite, including the “recall plebiscite”.
4. Direct Democracy Instruments in the Costa Rican Legal System 
Consultation of the People at the Municipal Level
The Principle of Active Citizen Participation
Although Costa Rica remains a centralized State, with strong concentration of power 
at  the  national  government  level,  the  Constitution  stipulates  in  article  170  that 
municipal corporations enjoy autonomy and thus the government will transfer certain 
attributions.  In this particular context, citizen participation in such important matters 
as,  for  instance,  land and zoning regulations,  commercial  and liquor  expenditure 
permits, or concession of State owned beaches, to name a few is without doubt to be 
promoted.   The  recently  adopted  Municipal  Code  does  provide  for  such  public 
participation,  both  with  the  referendum  adjunction  and  the  plebiscite,  on  local 
regulations and affairs respectively.  State of the Nation accurately states that “the 
new municipal  code approved  in  1998,  establishes  the  principle  of  active  citizen 
participation promotion (particularly with) the strengthening of Popular consultations; 
however, the practical implementation of these provisions is low”.10 
In article 5, the Code provides for a clear and explicit legal mandate addressed to the 
Municipalidades for promoting “active, conscious and democratic participation by the 
people  in  the  local  government’s  decisions”11.   The norm is  further  developed  in 
article  13,  wherein  the  municipal  governing  body,  the  Concejo,  is  given  the 
competency to decide the organization of referenda.12  Each Concejo must adopt an 
10 Auditoría Ciudadana sobre la calidad de la democracia, Costa Rica, 2001, pg. 49.
11 Municipal Code of 1998, Law number 7794, art.  5:  “Las municipalidades fomentarán la 
participación activa,  consciente  y  democrática  del  pueblo  en las decisiones del  gobierno 
local.”.
12 Art. 13, letter j) Municipal Code states:  “Son atribuciones del Concejo: (…) j) Acordar la  
celebración de plebiscitos, referendos y cabildos de conformidad con el reglamento que se  
elaborará con el asesoramiento del Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, observando, en cuanto  
a la forma e implementación de estas consultas populares, lo preceptuado por la legislación  
electoral vigente. En la celebración de los plebiscitos, referendos y cabildos que realicen las  
municipalidades, deberán estar presentes los delegados que designe el Tribunal Supremo de  
Elecciones, quienes darán fe de que se cumplieron los requisitos formales exigidos en el 
código y el reglamento supraindicado. Los delegados del Tribunal supervisarán el desarrollo  
8
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ordinance for regulating the holding of referenda, particularly in its form aspects and 
implementation,  for  which  the  rules  must  be  compatible  with  and  observe  the 
legislation in force.  Presumably, this last requirement referred to the electoral code, 
revised just a few months before the municipal code itself, and also to the regulation 
adopted by the Electoral Tribunal in the form of a so called Handbook, the  “Manual  
para la realización de consultas populares a nivel cantonal y distrital”, of October 
1998.  
The Handbook on “Consultas Populares”
This Handbook supposedly serves as a guide for  Concejos all around the Country, 
and provides model provisions and useful definitions which the municipal body may 
choose to incorporate in their regulations.  However, the truth is that this Handbook is 
not  merely  a  procedure  guidebook  but  it  in  fact  also  contains  many  interesting 
substantive provisions. The Handbook introduces a new concept which is not in the 
municipal  code.  The  consulta  popular or  consulting  the  people,  by  which  the 
Municipalidad may request citizens´ opinions on any actual issue of interest to the 
population,  within  the  attributions  and  jurisdiction  of  the  Municipalidad.13  This 
consultation  is  defined  in  a  general  way  as  the  mechanism  by  which  the 
Municipalidad submits a particular issue for the people to consider, for obtaining their 
opinion;14 and  so  includes  the  plebiscite  and  the  referendum.   The  referendum, 
consequently,  is  a  more  specific  instrument,  the  definition  of  which  is  “the 
consultation  by  which  the  object  is  the  approval,  modification  or  derogation  of  a 
municipal  regulation  or  provision  of  legal  nature”15.   The  referendum  is  clearly 
understood in its technical meaning, of a vote relating to a norm, a general rule, and 
not to specific decisions or other activity.   
This Electoral Tribunal provided Handbook constitutes the real basis and essential 
legal source through which direct democracy is implemented at the lower local level, 
by setting down a complete system of not only procedural  effects,  but also, most 
importantly, of unavoidable substantive provisions.  For instance, the Handbook sets 
a two year reiteration prohibition,  stating that the  Concejo may not  re-consult  the 
people on any issue previously voted on and rejected. It is in this Handbook that we 
find  the  rule on the  legal  effects  of  a  referendum; its  results  are binding  for  the 
Concejo.   The Handbook  answers  many other  equally  important  questions.   For 
instance, that only Costa Rican citizens who are registered as voters in the electoral 
list  for  that  Cantón may exercise  their  vote in  consultations  (article  3.1).   It  also 
establishes the  Concejo’s duty to publicize the referendum properly and correctly, 
and allow for an adequate discussion of the issues at stake, and to regulate the 
permitted “propaganda”.   Yet  another substantive rule is  how to draft  the subject 
question for consultation.  Article 3.7 indicates that the plebiscite or the referendum 
subject  question  must  be drafted in  a clear  and concise manner,  so as to  avoid 
confused, captious or ambiguous interpretations; and that the consulted person can 
only answer with a simple “yes” or a “no”.
correcto de los procesos citados”. 
13 Handbook, art. 2.2.
14 Ibid. Art. 2.1.1.
15 Ibid. Art. 2.1.3.
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Uncertain issues
It is not possible to assess in practice the suitability of these instruments and their 
particular regulations; for to date, more than eight years after their introduction, very 
few Cantons have adopted them and none has yet used consultation procedures, as 
far as we know, except for a couple of plebiscites convened for the creation of new 
districts.  From the purely legal standpoint, some questions remain, however.  What 
happens, one may ask, if the Municipalidad does not adopt the required regulation to 
incorporate  the  Handbook’s  provisions?  Our  first  assessment  is  that  this  would 
amount  to  a  violation  of  the  citizenry’s  constitutional  political  rights,  not  by 
commission but by an omission to enact the obligatory regulation.  It is our opinion 
that the Handbook is not directly applicable or “self-executing” to any Municipalidad, 
albeit the imperativeness of its speech.  However, it is probable that a Municipalidad 
would  nevertheless  apply  those rules  by default,  although without  a  proper  legal 
basis for the reasons mentioned. On the other hand, having said this, we consider, 
that  a  Municipalidad is  entitled  to  regulate  these  participation  instruments  as  it 
chooses, as part of its autonomy, even if this means straying from the Handbook; 
provided they adopt rules that grant a greater extent of rights to the people, but not if 
they further restrict their use.  By this we mean that a Municipalidad may decide it will 
accord voting rights to not only registered voters, but also to all  residents of legal 
age,  and,  arguably,  even  to  foreigners.   Of  course,  this  rests  upon  a  purely 
hypothetical scenario. 
Another example, not explicitly included in the Municipal Code or the Handbook, of 
what we consider could be adapted as part of municipal direct democracy regulations 
would be the possibility for the people to solicit a referendum.  This could be easily 
and  legally  achieved  by  regulating  the  conditions  and  requirements,  making 
analogical use of constitutional provisions which allow a relatively low percentage of 
citizens (5% at the national level) to demand the holding of a binding referendum.  In 
fact, we consider that this is a constitutional right which, since its introduction at the 
national level in 2003, may not be overlooked by local governments.
A final question may be addressed here:  In the event of a legal gap in either the 
municipal regulation or in the Handbook, will it be possible to apply the rules set forth 
in the new Law on Referendum?  To us the answer must be in the affirmative.  It is 
uncertain, however, if the opposite solution, to integrate and construct the national 
Law with these other legal documents or with municipal practice, will be valid; i.e. if  it 
is possible to use the Handbook rules  to organize the national scale referendum if no 
similar provision is provided in the law or the Constitution.  
The Referendum on Laws and Constitutional Amendments
Delegated Sovereignty 
The referendum is a true expression of sovereignty, understood in the classic sense 
as  the  power  belonging  to  the  citizenry  to  direct  their  destiny.   By  means  of  a 
referendum, all citizens who have attained majority can exert their right to vote either 
in  favour or  against  a  consulted legal  norm.  The range could vary from a mere 
opinion poll, to an act of sovereignty binding on all Authorities.  The results of such 
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voting could also vary, depending on elements such as the  issue in question, the 
level of participation and the rules which regulate the instrument.  Most importantly, 
and regardless of the legal effects of the voting results, the referendum is both a 
citizens’ democratic political right and a weapon of legitimacy for political and legal 
action. 
In Costa Rica, a referendum can be both organized at the Municipal local level, as 
discussed  above,  and  at  the  national  level  as  well.   The  subject-matter  of  a 
referendum vote, at the national level, can be either a constitutional amendment or a 
proposed  bill  of  parliament.   At  every  level,  and  depending  on  the  referendum 
subject, the referendum’s own specific set of rules will govern it.  At the national level, 
it  is  the  Law  on  Referendum,  together  with  articles  105,  129  and  195  of  the 
Constitution, which apply.   These recent reforms have been avowedly inspired by 
foreign legislations and practice; among those Switzerland’s and Italy’s come out top. 
The  concept  of  referendum  as  used  in  the  Constitution  is  linked  to  the  idea  of 
sovereignty  too.   In  Costa  Rica,  a  democratic  and  representative  regime16,   the 
sovereign power is said to reside, exclusively on the Nation, which in turn delegates it 
to its freely elected appointees.
Subject of the Referendum
The people entrust the power to enact laws or legislative authority to the Asamblea 
Legislativa (the Costa Rican parliament).  However, what the people give they can 
take back, as the saying goes, since this power  cannot be refused or waived.  In 
view  of  that,  the  2003  constitutional  amendment  to  Article  105  explicitly 
acknowledges  that  the  people  can  also,  through  the  referendum,  exercise  this 
legislative power. To be precise, the constitutional provision talks about the power of 
approving or annulling laws, and moreover states that this procedure may also be 
used to  vote  partial  amendments  to  the  Constitution.   Consequently,  a  complete 
reform of the Constitution would not be subject to referendum.  This is confirmed by 
Article 196 of the Constitution, which regulates general reforms, as it is confined to 
the Constituting Assembly option and qualified majority approval by Parliament; while 
Article 195, on partial amendments, does explicitly include the referendum as a valid 
procedural possibility.
Modalities 
A determined number of citizens can legitimately request the referendum; in which 
case it is called a ‘citizen referendum’; but either a two thirds vote from parliament, or 
the government,  with a simple parliament majority,  can also set it  up. In this last 
event,  the law speaks of  legislative referendum and referendum by governmental 
request17.   The  appellation  of  the  parliamentary  referendum  as  “legislative”  is 
confusing, because, although the subject referendi could be a “project of law” it could 
also be an amendment to a constitutional provision.  In fact, the adjective, as used 
16 See Art. 2, 9, and 105 of the Constitution.
17 See Section II of the Law on referendum, and particularly art. 12 and 13.
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here, is to qualify the body who is demanding that the bill of law or amendment be 
submitted to consultation in the form of a referendum, which as stated before is the 
Asamblea Legislativa, not the referendum itself.  Furthermore, the initiative to hold a 
referendum,  when  the  people  do  not  directly  request  it,  will  always  involve 
participation  by  the  people’s  representatives  in  parliament,  for  it  cannot  be 
summoned by government on its own accord alone.  This works as a safety measure 
to guarantee this instrument’s legitimate use.
With respect to ‘citizen referendum’, the rule included in the Constitution demands 
that  the  referendum  be  requested  by  at  least  5% of  “citizens  registered  on  the 
electoral roll”. The roll is constantly kept updated by the Electoral Tribunal.  This rule 
has been widely criticized, even by its own proponents.  The set percentage is too 
high  to  allow  for  the  mechanism’s  effective  use  and  also  deters  citizens  from 
participating in law making.  Additionally, the provision states the minimal threshold 
as a percentage of the electoral roll. As the roll is constantly changing and increasing 
in volume of registered voters, it adds a great deal of uncertainty to the rule.  For 
example; in this year alone, the percentage reflects an approximate 132,000 people 
up from an estimate of 129,000 people at the beginning of 2006.  Considering that 
the  law provides  for  a  9  month  term to  collect  the  needed  signatures,  then  the 
required  number,  in  the  case  of  a  referendum  petition  which  started  collecting 
signatures  at  the  start  of  the  year  and  filed  the  completed  signature  forms  in 
September, is open to question.  Neither the Constitution nor the law on referendum 
give an answer.  Our opinion is that the first step in the citizen referendum process, 
the official publication of the request to collect signatures, must define the number of 
signatures required as being 5% of the electoral roll at the time the request is filed. 
However, it would have made not only more sense, but also would have been easier 
and  more  practical  had  the  law required  a  definitive  number  of  valid  signatures 
instead; which in Costa Rica, could have been 50 or 100 thousand.
Restricted Domains and other Limitations
The  Constitution  reserves  a  list  of  matters  entirely  to  parliamentary  procedure; 
however,  it   excepts applying the referenda to projects relating to:  budget;  taxes; 
monetary and credit;  pensions;  security;  approval of  state loans and contracts;  or 
other  administrative acts.18  The listed items cover  a wide range of  State action, 
leaving out of the referendum’s scope certain “sensitive” subjects over which –it is 
still considered- citizens do not have the maturity or sufficient knowledge to vote on. 
However,  an inventory which recurs to such undetermined and obscure terms as 
“security” or “acts of administrative nature” will undoubtedly need interpretation by the 
Electoral Tribunal, which, in our opinion, must be a restrictive one so as to allow for 
maximum scope of the referendum’s application.   
18 Article 105.3 of the Constitution: “El referéndum no procederá si los proyectos son relativos 
a materia  presupuestaria,  tributaria,  fiscal,  monetaria,  crediticia,  de pensiones,  seguridad,  
aprobación de empréstitos y contratos o actos de naturaleza administrativa”.  It is interesting 
to  note  that  the  Law  on  referéndum  introduces  a  slight  grammatical  difference  in  the 
transcription of this list in its own art 2, as it reads: “…aprobación de emprestitos y contratos,  
ni  actos  de  naturaleza  administrative”  which  could  eventually  lead  to  different  and  even 
conflicting interpretations.
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Another  unavoidable  limit  is  rooted in  Article  2  of  the Law on Referendum. This 
provision  states  that  no  more  than  one  referendum  may  be  held  each  year. 
Moreover, no referendum may be scheduled during the six months prior to or after 
presidential elections.  Article 2 imposes two extremely restrictive term conditions for 
the conduct of a referendum.  The first restriction is there for purely practical financial 
reasons, as the organization of a referendum at the national scale represents a huge 
expense for a still developing nation such as Costa Rica.  The second one has to do 
with the need to differentiate between the election of the head of State, who will be 
appointed for a four years term, and a referendum on a current determined issue 
being submitted to voters, i.e. to assure that all the issues at stake in a presidential 
campaign for  election  receive a wide  coverage and that  the coverage cannot  be 
narrowed to a single issue as in a referendum; and to prevent electors from allowing 
their preferred political adherence to interfere with an impartial judgement that should 
prevail when voting in a referendum.  The  restriction also attempts to prevent the 
referendum from becoming a purely political and electoral instrument.  However, in 
practice, this means that a maximum of three referenda may be held per presidential 
term, and this restriction minimizes the opportunities for public participation. It also 
unintentionally  allows  the  government  to  manipulate  the  issues  to  bring  to 
referendum.19 For example, the government can chose to summon a referendum on 
issues  it  deems  of  importance  to  its  policy  through  the  so-called  “executive” 
referendum, with the aim of preventing the people from requesting a referendum on 
matters wherein citizens’ interests collide with those of government. 
Procedure
The  procedural  aspects  of  referenda,  whether  constitutional  or  legal,  of  citizen 
initiative,  or  of  “legislative”  or  “executive”  origin,  are entirely  regulated in  the  Ley 
sobre  Regulación  del  Referéndum,  Law  number  8492,  or  simply  the  Law  on 
Referendum.  The Law first explains the procedural differences in what we may call 
the pre-referendum stages; i.e. the process leading to the summons of the official 
referendum. Once the prerequisites are all met, for instance collecting  the required 
number of signatures for the citizen referendum, the proper referendum procedure 
will commence20.  A notice of referendum will first be filed to the Electoral Tribunal, 
together  with  the  bill  of  law or  proposed amendment,  and then published  in  the 
Official Journal, La Gaceta. It must include the project details and the date on which 
the  referendum  will  take  place.  This  formal  communication  will  also  include  the 
drafted questions to which the voters can check the  “yes” or “no” answers.  The 
referendum must be held on a Sunday, within the ninety days following publication of 
the  official  notice.   The Electoral  Code  expressly  contains  all  the  regulations  for 
national elections including voting procedure and counting of votes and any other 
practical aspects on how to conduct the referendum.
Results
19 Roca Petitjean, citing Sartori, explicitly refers to this point in page 7 of his referenced work 
and states: “Es importante preguntarse quién establece los puntos que serán sometidos a  
referendo.  La consulta referendaria casi siempre es convocada “desde arriva”, por el poder  
político, aunque toda legislación establece formas en la que le derecho es utilizado por los  
ciudadanos”.
20 Ibid. Articles 16ss.
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The Electoral Tribunal has two weeks from the referendum date to count the votes 
and  officially  declare  the  results  of  the  referendum.  The results  are  immediately 
notified to parliament. Then, provided a minimum 30% of registered voters participate 
in the referendum the results become binding, and any laws adopted by referendum 
become obligatory in accordance with the Constitution and the Law on referendum,, 
If the referendum relates to either a proposed amendment to the Constitution or a 
legislative  matter  that  ordinarily  requires  a  qualified  majority,  this  participation 
threshold raises to a minimum of 40% of the electorate.
Publicising the Question Submitted to Referendum 
 
It is fundamental for the referendum to be effectively democratic that both the text 
submitted to vote and the question to be asked, are given adequate publicity and 
diffusion.    However,  this entails  significant  expense on the government's budget, 
added  to  those  associated  with  the  organization  of  the  referendum  per  se. 
Parliament’s  research institute warned  of  this  contingency and clearly  outlined  in 
relation to the referendum that "governmental expenses may increase due to the cost 
implicated  in  maintaining  a  fully  informed  public”.21  The  Electoral  Tribunal  was 
nonetheless commissioned by the Law to ensure publicity to both the referendum 
notice  and  its  text  via  official  media  "to  the  extent  of  its  possibilities";  meaning 
through radio and television stations; and in local as well as national newspapers22.  
Whatever the case,  the referendum Law regulates further on all  public  or  private 
campaigning in relation to the issues to be voted on by referendum; it specifically 
prohibits any public entity from using its budget for campaigning either in favour or 
against  the  subject  of  the  referendum.   Foreigners  cannot  participate  in  the 
referendum in any of  its  stages;  they can neither  vote,  nor  collect  signatures,  or 
donate to the campaign.   Hence, only Costa Rican citizens may "contribute" to the 
"yes" or the "no" campaign.    Even then, however,  contributions must not exceed 
€3.000  (approximately).   It  is  obvious  that  these  rules  on  both  publicity  and 
campaigning are designed to deter any interference from either the government, non-
Costa Ricans, financially powerful individuals or interest groups in order to preserve 
the  transparency  of  the  ideas  being  debated  upon,  thus  decreasing  the  risk  of 
influencing public opinion. 
Legislative and Constitutional Iniciativa Popular
The Iniciativa Popular  Office
21 CEDIL, Referendum and Plebiscite, pg. 3.
22 Article  19  of  the  Law on  Referendum:  “Artículo  19.—Difusión  del  texto  sometido  a 
referéndum.  El aviso de convocatoria  al  referéndum y su texto  serán publicados en  La 
Gaceta  por el  TSE, que podrá difundir,  además, en la medida de sus posibilidades, una  
síntesis del texto, por medio de las estaciones de televisión y radio nacionales y regionales y  
los periódicos de circulación nacional y regional.”
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Before  the  Iniciativa  Popular mechanism  was  adopted  into  the  Constitutional 
framework of Costa Rica as a true direct democracy procedure a first, less finite, 
attempt to grant citizens the initiative on legislation had been implemented through 
the creation of the  Oficina de Iniciativa Popular, a specialized body of parliament. 
From June 1998, this Office has worked as an “effective instrument of social active 
participation, by means of which any person (and not just those over 18) may learn,  
get to know, give their opinion, pronounce themselves and propose ideas in the law 
forming process with the certainty that  their  proposals  will  reach the members of 
parliament”.23  Indeed, the Office’s main tasks have developed in two directions: first, 
as an information office functioning as link between parliament and the people; and 
second, as the agency in charge of receiving and channelling  citizens’ expectations 
and opinions, and then transmitting these to the citizens’ representatives.  In fact, the 
results of these objectives may be assessed as poor, taking into account that in its 8 
years of existence it has only received about 550 “initiatives”, most of which are in 
fact opinions,  comments, suggestions,  and complaints,  from which less than 10% 
have caught the attention of parliament and made their way into the legislative flow, 
and only 5%  became a new Costa Rica law. 
With  the  new  law, Iniciativa  Popular, having  entered  into  force  the  Office  is 
commanded  with  the  additional,  and  potentially  more  important  responsibility  for 
providing technical support and advice at no charge on the drafting of proposals, as 
well as on the procedures that must be followed by citizens interested in exercising 
their right of Iniciativa Popular .24
The Popular Initiative in the Constitution
The  2003 package reform introduced, together with the referendum, the well known 
instrument  of  direct  democracy  called  the  iniciativa  popular,  whereby  a 
predetermined  number  of  citizens  ,  (5%  of  the  electorate),  may  initiate  the  law 
making  process  by  filing  a  drafted  or  formulated  bill  or  proposal  for  a  partial 
constitutional amendment, with parliament.   Although the relevant provision of the 
Constitution, Article 123, only barely develops this mechanism of public participation, 
it does set a list of topics on what may not be addressed in the proposed initiative. 
This inventory of prohibited subjects is essentially the same found with respect to the 
referendum, even though such restrictions are meaningless in the case of Iniciativa 
Popular, for reasons brought up below.
Since the list  in Article 123 is exhaustive, it  may be interesting to note that some 
sensitive topics, such as migration and foreigners or criminal law, could be presented 
as Iniciativas Populares, as long as they do not conflict with human rights principles.  
A weakened Iniciativa Popular 
In Costa Rica, a Iniciativa Popular does not automatically and imperatively end in a 
vote by the citizens.  Instead, the Implementation Law, which came to being early in 
23 Urbina, Sandra, head coordinator of the Popular Initiative Office, article published in “La 
República”, September 2006.
24 Article 7 of the Law of Popular Initiative.
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2006 under the name  Ley de iniciativa  popular,  number  8491,  interprets that  the 
constitutional norm requests that the initiative be voted upon as a requirement; but 
this obligation refers to an ordinary vote by parliament, and not a vote by the citizens 
themselves through a complementary referendum.25  As a group of  congressmen 
stated in 2003, the Iniciativa Popular as a direct democratic instrument, “finds specific 
justification, particularly in those systems which automatically submit the proposed 
project  of  law,  if  it  is  not  already  accepted  by  parliament,  to  a  referendum. 
Otherwise, it is easier to resort to parliamentary initiative, which is made by a single 
congressman and bears the same effects!”.26 This signifies that,  at  least in Costa 
Rica, it is simpler for a citizen to find the elected representative and have him or her 
file  the  initiative  in  parliament,  than  go  through  the  whole  process  of  signature 
collecting, for both initiatives have essentially the same force and effects, and will 
transit through the same complex procedure. 
This  interpretation  obviously  discourages  citizens  from  using  this  participative 
instrument, as the final decision will still rely on law makers, who could simply choose 
to reject the proposal.  Even if lawmakers favourably receive the proposal, arguably 
they could modify, amend and substantially alter the proposed draft, for nowhere is it 
stated that  the  initiative  must  be  voted on in  the  condition  it  was  filed.   This  is 
confirmed by the fact that the law on Iniciativa Popular provides that the initiative will 
follow the ordinary legislative procedures, and is subject  to both first  and second 
debate in plenary sessions.
Moreover,  all  remaining interest  that  the citizens may have in using the  iniciativa 
popular is definitely impaired by the high percentage of signatures needed to back up 
and validate the initiative, which is currently 5% of registered voters.  Realistically, we 
cannot expect anybody to expend valuable resources to obtain more than a hundred 
thousand signatures for filing a bill, even a constitutional amendment proposal, when 
the same results may be achieved through considerably less effort, particularly when 
the final outcome of the initiative depends on parliament alone.
Of  note,  there  is  currently  a  proposed  amendment  hidden  in  the  parliament’s 
drawers,  which  seeks  to  lower  the  required  percentage  necessary  for  filing  an 
initiative  from  5%  to  1.5%  of  the  Electoral  Roll,  (this  translates  currently  to 
approximately forty thousand people).27
5. Perspectives of e-Democracy in Costa Rica 
Use of technology has spread to the point that Costa Rica is now one of the few Latin 
American Nations with wide internet diffusion.   Although there is an identifiable gap 
between  the  periphery  and  centre,  not  only  to  access  but  also  to  technical 
knowledge, one can speak in Costa Rica of a "democratization" of internet and IT 
25 Article 6 ibid.
26 Bill  to  amend  articles  105,  123,  129  and  195  of  the  Constitution,  file  number  14776. 
Interestingly, this proposal comes from the same proponents as the original law.
27 Ibid. 
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access.  This has led to governmental agencies exhibiting greater interest in using 
this technological tool for all kinds of purposes; such as: internal communications; 
efficiency;  rapid  response;  public  information;  etc.  From anybody's  laptop via the 
internet  public  services  can  now  be  requested  and  public  information  easily 
accessed.   The  current  government  has  played  a  particularly  active  role  in 
modernizing and "digitalizing" the public sector; although, during the last presidential 
election campaign internet was also a widely employed medium of communication for 
political parties as they were able to make proposals and political guidelines available 
to anybody. 
 
The Electoral Tribunal, also, has shown a proactive position specifically in regard to 
the use of new technologies in electoral processes.  The effort has been targeted 
towards information and transparency of the electoral process, with a continuously 
updated portal on line which, during the last presidential election, made available the 
scrutiny results of an almost perfect tied election thus giving security and certainty to 
the electorate that the votes were been respected.  
But the role of the Electoral Tribunal has gone further still.  A Sub-commission on e-
voting was created with the mandate to put in place a prototype plan that has been 
worked upon since early 2000 for implementing electronic voting.28 A preliminary and 
small scale test was carried out during the December 2002 mayoral elections when 
an e-voting  system was set  up inside  the voting booths,  alongside the old  –and 
current- paper vote, providing the voters with an alternate method to use if they so 
preferred.  On  that  occasion,  the  pilot  plan  was  on  trial  in  133  voting  centres 
throughout the Country.  Unfortunately, four years have since passed and with the 
next mayoral election just around the corner there is still no official plan to perform 
any new "test" of  the presumably improved system, thereby denying the e-voting 
option to electors.  In a recent newspaper article, it was suggested that the computer 
equipment of the all public schools throughout the Country, which already serve as 
voting  centres,  be  adapted  and  used  for  e-voting,  in  order  to  make  electoral 
processes less costly.  This simple but brilliant initiative has  found no positive echo 
in the halls of the Electoral Tribunal, even though we agree that this would eventually 
be an effective solution to palliate one of the biggest handicaps of direct democracy 
for developing Nations: the high expenses involved in the consultation process.
In addition, we can regret that no reference to e-voting was introduced as part of the 
new Law on Referendum provisions.  To us, this is a disappointing drawback from 
the inspiring efforts of the 2002 project.  Plus, referendum would have been a great 
opportunity, due to the simplicity of the answer that voters must provide –yes or no- 
to  “educate”  the  people  on  the  use  of  these  technologies  applied  to  citizen 
democratic participation procedures.  
However,  civil  society  has  been  making  a  democratic  use  of  information 
technologies,  and  especially  of  internet  (emails,  virtual  polls  on  political  issues, 
discussion boards, virtual registration to political organizations) in a way which has 
helped  the  flow of  ideas,  created public  awareness  on certain  issues of  national 
interest and allowed for greater participation by,  at  least,  part  of  the Costa Rican 
citizenry.  Eventually, we may predict, such means of information and communication 
28 Cf. Electoral Tribunal minutes of session 87-2002.
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will  serve as perhaps the more important  instrument to collect  signatures,  diffuse 
arguments and campaign once the referendum is effectively absorbed by the Costa 
Rican political system.
6. Conclusions
Costa  Rica  is  a democratic  Nation.   It  is  the  most  democratic  Central  American 
Country.  It is also one of the most outstanding democracies in Latin America.  Its 
evolution from pure representative to participative (as it has consensually been called 
in our political environment) has been measured.  Like a good wine, it is the product 
of a maturing process which has allowed it to gain new aromas and flavours: direct 
democratic instruments.  This rich wine has only recently been decanted, and is now 
ready to be enjoyed, yet remains to be tasted.
As two Acts on direct democracy procedures at the national level were passed only 
earlier  this  year (2006),  citizens  have  not  yet  had  time  to  truly  apprehend  the 
extraordinary change in their political rights. Additionally, the government has made 
no effort to adequately inform the people of these powerful instruments they may now 
recur to, to make their voices heard.  The fact that these instruments have not yet 
been tested, either at the lower municipal level or the national level, makes it difficult 
to  assess  their  appropriateness.  Notwithstanding,  certain  organized  groups  have 
already  made  official  their  intention  to  collect  signatures,  in  order  to  petition  a 
referendum on whether to ratify the Free Trade Agreement signed two years ago with 
the United States of America.  
On this issue, the ongoing debate is boiling. It  has been suggested that the past 
presidential elections could be translated as an opinion thermometer between those 
who were in favour of approving this International Agreement, and those opposing it; 
reading an almost perfect 50% on each side.  Any referendum on this subject could 
nevertheless only serve as a consultative tool, as it can have no binding effect; the 
referendum cannot  relate  to  an international  treaty,  but  only  to  internal  laws  and 
constitutional  amendments.    It  would  be true that  the results of  this  referendum 
would legitimatise Parliament’s final decision; and, most importantly, could serve as a 
steam escape valve for the existing heated tensions which, as some extremist labour 
union leaders have threatened, could eventually lead to violent street protests.  
  
The true challenge for Costa Rica is to make these instruments widely known, and 
accustom people to their having been granted this opportunity to directly define both 
their own and their country’s future.  And so, quoting a recent major Costa Rican 
newspaper  editorial  "let  it  be  in  the  voting  booths  of  the  referendum where  the 
destiny of  the Free Trade Agreement  is  decided,  and not  in  the "referendum” of 
street blockages and violence ".29
And therein lays the virtue of institutionalized democratic participation procedures like 
the referendum, which can strengthen and support both the country's stability and the 
democratic regime; while completing the representative system in which many of the 
29 Madrigal Castro, Álvaro, La República, June 8th 2006.
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Costa Rican people still have faith.   For then, Costa Rica will have truly earned both 
its worldwide respect and the nickname “the Switzerland of Central America”.  
San José, Costa Rica, October the 17th of 2006.
***
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Annex i) Direct Democratic Instruments at the Local Level.
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